Dr Jonathan Kenigson, FRSA

For Fellows of Glasgow Philosophical Society

In the past quarter-century, Habermas' theory of communicative action has exerted profound influences upon applied ethics. Habermansian critical theory has been a focus of extensive scholarly attention in recent decades, with the thesis of universal communicative rationality coming under attack of theorists of agonistic republicanism, most notably culminating in the Habermas-Mouffe debate and emotivist reactions against the enlightenment rationalist project. The contours of this debate are well trodden and will not be limned further here. In light of the Habermas-Mouffe debate, it is instructive to consider Habermas' notion of the enlightenment project and the commonalities between theories of individual and collective consciousness embodied in the rationalist tradition beginning with the transcendentalism of Kant and finding its most nuanced expression in Hegel's dialecticism. Critiques of Habermas' dialogical ethics and repudiation of postmodern metaphysics can be found in such diverse sources as Rehg (2003); McCarthy (1991); and Rawls (1997).

Further clarification of these objections can be found in Heath (2001) and related synoptical sources (Taylor 1991). Despite Habermas' eulogy for Sartre and his metaphysical system, no peer-reviewed research has been conducted regarding possible Sartrean influences on Habermas' critical dialectical theory. The primary contributions made by the current essay lie in the theses that: (1) the dialectic between the Sartrean praxis and being-for-itself is homologous to the Habermansian notion of the dialectic of knowledge in practical discourse; (2). Habermansian and Sartrean notions of rationality differ in the sense that Sartre locates rationality in the individual ego whereas Habermas locates rationality in language itself.

A derivative conclusion is that Habermansian and Sartrean ethics differ in their loci of rationality: in Sartre, deriving from individual agency (so-called 'authenticity'), and in Habermas deriving from a pluralistic theory of deliberative truth. The Sartrean subject is subdivided into two ontological-factical components: being-in-itself ("en-soi:) and being-for-itself ("pour-soi") that very roughly correspond to the conscious\cognitive and unconscious\noncognitive aspects of selfhood (Detmer 1988; Dobson 1993; Flynn 1984; Sartre 2000; 1948; 1976; 2007). In addition, a third division of the self - the 'being-for-others,' is present in some Sartrean accounts (pour-autrui) - a facet of being principally countenanced in the objectifying nihilation of the other (Detmer 1988; Dobson 1993; Flynn 1984).

For Sartre, it is ultimately the practical-analytic aspect of the existential psychoanalytic project that lends itself to the self-construction of an authentic - and ethically and emotionally successful - subject (Sartre 1948; 1976; 2007). Because of the heraclitean fluidity of the for-itself, with its perpetual self-nonidentity and protean dynamism, the existential-psychoanalytic project is never a "stasis" or a "fait accompli" (Sartre 1976; 2007). Rather, self-construction is a perpetually contradictory self-postulation and a postulation against being which is the engine of both radical freedom and existential anxiety. The for-itself, trapped (or, using Heideggerian terms 'thrown') in the transcendence of freedom, is always beyond the factical artifacts of embodied selfhood or material culture, both of which are directed as praxis - the actions of being in material context (Dobson 1993; Flynn 1984; Sartre 2000; 1948; 1976; 2007).

Consciousness and the artifacts of consciousness are always transcendent of the material and social roles that constitute the practical reason guiding, for instance economic interactions (the logic of exchange); customs (the 'is\ought' aspect of received historical traditions); and the reification of metaphysics that seek to locate it in a transcendent or panentheistic Being postulated over and against the concrete interactions that define the daily activities of being in the world (e.g. Leibniz's monadology, Heidegger's 'Being in the World,' or Husserl's ontological reduction). The practico-inert in-itself is participatory in the teleological move between material and conscious substance that is creativity - or, collectively, the storehouse of generative agency that the for-itself exerts in whatever 'progress' society may be said to make (Detmer 1988; Dobson 1993; Flynn 1984; McBride 1991; Santoni 1995; Sartre 2000; 1948; 2007).

The practico-inert, whether in the reified social institutions of the welfare state or the precepts of a received metaphysical or religious tradition, are the sedimentations of previous praxes and the raw material for present praxis (Detmer 1988; Dobson 1993; Flynn 1984; McBride 1991; Santoni 1995). Praxis, then, is itself in possession of a teleological logic (dialectical reason) that directs the evolution of institutions by limiting the universe of discourse upon which practical reason exercises deliberative agency (McBride 1991; Santoni 1995). The practico-inertia of language is consequently cast against the praxis of the present speech act, in which the for-itself renders deliberative judgments in relation to a received tradition. The dialectic of praxis is not (in any Hegelian sense) the telos of some rational consensus in science or society, but rather the aggregated collection of tacit assumptions concerning both the structure and objects of reason (Dobson 1993; Flynn 1984).

https://medium.com/@jonathanjkenigson/habermas-lecture-dublin-2023-94ff6b91d32